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Non-technical Summary 
For innovative start-ups, an effective patent system is a crucial factor for success and 
survival. The importance of patents for start-ups is based on two features. First, 
patents grant temporary monopoly rights for the protected invention and thereby help 
start-up firms to appropriate returns from their R&D investments. Second, patents 
certify the new venture’s quality to outside investors. Attracting investors is essential 
but at the same time difficult for new ventures because there is uncertainty about their 
future success. 
The desirable positive effects of patents for new ventures are based on the assumption 
that the patent system works efficiently. The European patent system has experienced 
the steep increase of patent pendencies in response to a surge in patent applications 
over the past decades. These delays create uncertainties about the patent grant and 
scope for patent applicants and investors.  
This paper examines the impact of patent pendencies on a start-up company’s new 
product launch and its ability to attract external funds, specifically venture capital and 
bank financing. Product launch may be postponed if patents are pending because 
start-ups may be reluctant to engage in necessary follow-up investments for product 
development before being granted protection of the underlying intellectual property. 
Regarding external funds, we expect that risk-prone investors with a high involvement 
in the start-ups company like venture capitalists value pending patents. Cautious 
investors like banks might be reluctant to invest if a start-up’s patent are pending 
since these patent applications do not provide collateral. 
For a large sample of German start-up companies across different industries, we find 
that patent pendencies significantly lower the likelihood of new product launches 
indicating that entrepreneurs postpone commercialization if they are confronted with 
uncertain intellectual property rights. With regards to ventures’ access to finance, we 
find that pending patent applications attract venture capital financing. Bank financing 
is not influenced by pending patents. 
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Abstract 
Classical patent literature assumes that patents grant well-defined legal rights to 
exclude others from practicing an invention. In this scenario, start-up companies 
benefit from the exclusive right to commercialize patent-protected inventions and the 
certification effect of patents which signals the ventures’ “quality” to investors. If the 
decision about patent applications is pending at the patent office patent rights become 
probabilistic and both effects may not realize. We show that start-up companies are 
reluctant to launch new products if patents are pending. Further, pending patents 
attract risk-seeking investors (venture capitalists), while more cautious investors 
(banks) do not react on pending patents.  
 
Keywords: start-ups, patents, probabilistic patents, pending patents, access to finance, 
new product launch 
 
JEL: L26, O31, O34 
 
Contact: 
Diana Heger, IHS Economics, Bleichstrasse 1, 60313 Frankfurt, Germany, email: 
dianaheger@gmail.com 
Katrin Hussinger, University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, 
Centre of Research in Economics and Management, 162 A, Avenue de la Faïencerie, 1511 
Luxembourg, Luxembourg, phone: +352 46 66 44 6404, email: katrin.hussinger@uni.lu 
                                                 
1 We thank Antonio Della Malva, Adam Jaffe and Francesco Lissoni for helpful comments. We further thank 
Thorsten Doherr and Daniel Hoewer for data support. 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“An effective patent system offers protection for new entrants to the market, who do 
not have the distribution networks or reputation that can in some ways protect 
inventions. Their main strategic defense is intellectual property.” Intellectual property 
rights (IPR) are one of the important pre-requisites for successful entrepreneurship as 
exemplified by Guellec and Sachwald (2008).
1
  
The classical patent literature defines IPR, and patents in particular, as devices that 
grant their owners a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the 
invention. From this point of perspective, the importance of IPR for new ventures 
rests upon two features. First, patents grant temporary monopoly rights for protected 
inventions. Thereby, patents help start-up companies appropriating returns from their 
R&D investments (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006, Cohen et al., 2000, Dechenaux et al., 
2008). They do so by safeguarding investments in complementary assets which are 
required for transferring inventions into marketable products (Teece, 1986) and by 
facilitating licensing in case the start-up does not aim at commercializing the 
invention itself (Gans et al., 2008).  
Second, patents can certify the start-up company’s “quality” to outside investors (Hsu 
and Ziedonis, 2008). External funds are often essential for new ventures that lack 
internal means for growth and innovation (Stinchcombe, 1965). At the same time, 
attracting investors is difficult for new ventures since their “quality” is unknown and 
their future success is difficult to predict (Stuart et al., 1999). Investors therefore 
                                                 
1 Guellec and Sachwald (2008) analyze the failure of the Lisbon Agenda which was designed to be the roadmap 
for Europe to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy.   
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search for tools to reduce the information gap (Amit et al., 1990). Patents can act as a 
certification tool by reducing uncertainty with regards to the ventures’ technological 
capabilities and its growth and market potential (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008, Haeussler et 
al., 2008). Since patents are only granted for inventions that prove technical feasibility 
and industrial applicability (Article 52(1) of the European Patent Convention) they 
represent a major step towards a proof of concept. Due to the monopoly right that 
patents grant they can further increase the ventures’ collateral value for investors.  
The predicted positive effects of patents for new ventures are based on the assumption 
that the patent system works efficiently. If, for instance, a patent system grants patents 
for marginal inventions - as has been criticized with regards to the U.S. patent system 
(e.g. Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) - the certification value of patents vanishes. With respect 
to the European patent system, the steep increase of patent pendencies in response to a 
surge in patent applications over the past decades raised concerns (Harhoff and 
Wagner, 2009, Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Such inefficiencies of patent systems render 
patent rights probabilistic (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Against the classical patent 
literature that defines patents as devices that grant their owners well-defined legal 
rights allowing the exclusion of third parties from practicing the invention, the view 
that patents are probabilistic acknowledges that, in practice, the rights afforded to 
patent holders are highly uncertain.   
In this study, we investigate the implications of patent pendencies as one distinctive 
source of uncertainty surrounding the patenting process. Pending patents induce 
uncertainties regarding the grant decision, the grant date and the patent scope as well 
as the strategic value of the invention (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, Gans et al., 2008). 
The patent applicant may respond by postponing follow-up investments required for 
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transferring the technical invention into a marketable product (Cohen et al., 2000, 
Dechenaux et al., 2008, Teece, 1986) with potentially serious consequences for young 
ventures’ profitability, growth and survival prospect.  
Pending patents can further impact the venture’s access to external finance. The 
direction of this effect is, however, ambiguous and depends on the type of investor. 
Patent applications (rather than granted patents) can attract risk-prone investors, like 
venture capitalists (VCs), because the patent application may serve as proof of 
concept (Haeussler et al., 2008). Pending patents which correspond to a not yet 
commercialized invention can increase VCs’ returns to investment. VCs might, 
further, prefer uncertain IPR as they can provide opportunities for expropriation of the 
ventures’ technologies (Ueda, 2004, Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). More cautious 
investors relying on collateralization, like banks, presumably do not attribute value to 
pending patent applications. They are rather expected to be reluctant to invest in 
research and development (R&D) intense ventures with pending patents since R&D 
intense firms are risky investment projects and because R&D and pending patent 
applications do not provide collateral value.  
In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of patent pendencies on new 
ventures’ ability to attract external funds both from banks and VCs. We focus on 
these two types of investors because they are located at the opposite ends of the risk-
aversion spectrum. We further analyze whether pending patents influence the 
likelihood of product launches by new ventures. Our results for a large sample of 
German start-up companies across different industries show that patent pendencies 
significantly lower the likelihood of new product launches suggesting that 
entrepreneurs postpone commercialization if they are confronted with uncertain IPR. 
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With regards to ventures’ access to finance, we find that pending patent applications 
attract venture capital financing. Banks, in contrast, do not value pending patents, but 
do not show a negative reaction to pending patents either. This suggests that an 
inefficient patent system holds back commercialization activities by new ventures, but 
does not necessarily restrict their access to external finance.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on probabilistic patents and their 
implications for companies (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, Gans et al., 2008). Only 
recently, researchers started relaxing the assumption of patents as well-defined, 
bulletproof means of intellectual property protection. The literature which is 
concerned with the implication of a different view on IPR is accordingly still limited, 
but suggests that the view on patents as probabilistic protection instruments 
challenges prior stylized findings (Gans et al., 2008, Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Our 
study contributes to this literature by showing that it is not the well-defined patent that 
attracts VCs, but that pending patents are of higher value to these risk-loving investors 
that aim at financial profits as well as on knowledge capture.  
This study further contributes to the literature on the importance of patents for access 
to external financing for new ventures (Baum and Silverman, 2004, Hsu and Ziedonis, 
2008, Haeussler et al., 2008). These prior studies often focus exclusively on risk-
taking VCs as sources of external funds for new ventures. Our study focuses in 
addition on banks as a risk-averse source of financing. As expected, the importance of 
patents and pending patents differs according to the risk attitude of the external 
investor.  
Lastly, our study focuses on the two pillars of the patent system that can support new 
ventures, its protective function as well as its function as a certification devise. To our 
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knowledge, prior studies focus on either of them rather than analyzing both 
dimensions. A joint analysis is interesting from a theoretical as well as a 
methodological point of perspective because the access to external funding and new 
product launches are likely to be interdependent for new ventures.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature. Section 3 introduces our data set before and shows descriptive 
statistics. In section 4, we present our empirical results and the last section concludes. 
THEORY 
Patents as Intellectual Property Protection Devices 
The main function of patent systems is to grant property rights on technical inventions 
in order to increase incentives to innovate in the economy. Firms tend to under-invest 
in R&D as their ideas can be subject to expropriation (Arrow, 1962). Like public 
goods, inventions are non-rival in use in the sense that the result of innovative efforts 
can be used by more than one party at the same time without restricting the use of the 
same invention for others. In addition, knowledge is non-excludable so that it is 
impossible or difficult to exclude third parties from using an invention. Inventions are, 
hence, costly to develop while they can be copied at relatively low costs (Mansfield et 
al., 1977). Furthermore, the outcome of innovation projects and the returns to R&D 
investments are highly uncertain compared to investments in tangible assets. As a 
consequence, investment into R&D in the private sector is lower than socially 
desirable. The patent system provides incentives to innovate by helping inventors 
appropriating the returns to their R&D investment.   
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Patents occur at an intermediate stage of the innovation process: They are applied for 
after a research project led to results, but before a new product is developed and 
introduced into the market. Commercialization requires investments into 
complementary assets which are substantial and difficult to redeploy (Teece, 1986). 
Patents help safeguarding follow-up investments since they guarantee that third 
parties cannot use the respective invention without permission of the patent right 
holder (Cohen et al., 2000, Dechenaux et al., 2008). 
The positive effects of patents as a means to safeguard R&D investments and 
complementary investments by limiting the threat of imitation can realize if the patent 
system works as designed in theory. In practice, patent systems are characterized by 
various types of uncertainty which can affect patent applicants’ commercialization 
decision (Lemley and Shapior, 2005, Gans et al., 2008). Uncertainty about the grant 
decision is only resolved once the final decision (grant/reject) about the patent 
application is reached. Patent scope uncertainty stems from the fact that examiners 
may require the applicant to abandon specific claims or to change the specification of 
claims in the course of the examination. The final scope of patent protection is only 
revealed once the patent is granted. Furthermore, uncertainty about the economic and 
strategic value of the invention exists since the value of the underlying invention may 
only become apparent to the applicant, competitors, potential investors and licensees 
once the patent is granted. Lastly, there is pendency uncertainty which corresponds to 
the duration of the patent examination. Pendency periods vary substantially across 
technological areas, patent and applicant characteristics (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009, 
Popp et al., 2004, Regibeau and Rockett, 2007). Only after the pendency time elapsed 
patent applicants learn about the grant decision, the patent scope and get a better idea 
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of the strategic value of the patent. While under the assumption of patents as a perfect 
protection devise, one would expect a strictly positive effect of IPR on 
commercialization efforts, the notion of probabilistic patents which accounts for 
uncertainties surrounding IPR leads us to the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Uncertainties about IPR decrease the likelihood of new product launch 
by start-up firms. 
Patents as Certificates for External Capital Providers      
It is a well-documented fact that innovative start-up companies often face financial 
constraints (e.g. Himmelberg and Peterson, 1994, Hall, 2002, Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott, 2011, Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). For start-up companies, internal 
financing is important, but often not sufficient for financing innovation because new 
ventures do not possess a portfolio of sales generating products which can be used for 
financing innovation activities and new product development. The acquisition of 
external funds is difficult for young innovative companies as well (Leland and Pyle, 
1977, Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983, Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994, Hall, 2002, 
Harhoff, 1998). This is because the “quality” of start-up firms is not directly 
observable for external investors. The relationship between investors and young 
ventures is characterized by a substantial degree of asymmetric information (Spence, 
1973). Investors search for information that reduces uncertainty about the quality of 
new ventures (Amit et al., 1990, Hall and Hofer, 1993). Quality revealing information 
can come from different sources like the characteristics of the entrepreneur herself 
such as her educational background and working track record (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1990, Burton et al. 2002, Shane and Stuart 2002, Dick et al., 2013) and 
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the ventures’ inter-organizational networks (Stuart et al., 1999). In case of R&D 
intensive start-ups, quality assessment is especially difficult because R&D 
incorporates technological uncertainty and market risk in addition to the typical risks 
surrounding start-up companies (Hall, 2002, 2005, Arrow, 1962, Lessat et al., 1999). 
The uncertainty associated with R&D translates into highly skewed returns on 
investments (Cassar, 2004, Moore, 1994). Patents may serve as quality certification 
for the ventures’ technologies and technological capabilities (Hsu and Ziedonies, 
2008, Haeussler et al., 2008). 
In light of patents as well-defined, unchallengeable protection devices, previous 
literature has shown that patents are an important criterion for VCs. Baum and 
Silverman (2004) investigate the screening process of VCs in the U.S. and show that 
patents have a positive impact on the amount of venture capital it receives. Hsu and 
Ziedonis (2008) find a positive effect of patents on investors’ perception of the 
company’s value for a sample of venture capital financed U.S. semiconductor start-
ups. Ventures holding patents, further, attract more prominent VCs (Hsu and 
Ziedonis, 2008).  
Baum and Silverman (2004) and Haeussler et al. (2008) distinguish between the 
patent application and the patent grant as signals for VC investors. Baum and 
Silverman (2004) find a strong effect of patent applications and a weaker effect of 
patent grants for their U.S. sample. Focusing on a sample of German and U.K. start-
ups and their European patent records, Haeussler et al. (2008) find that firms with 
patent applications attract venture capital funding earlier than others. They find no 
additional effect of the patent grant decision for the timing of venture capital 
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investment.
2
 In line with the definition of patents as probabilistic intellectual property 
protection devices, prior findings suggest that risk-loving investors value patent 
applications more strongly than granted patents. 
Previous studies only consider the certification effect of patents for VCs. Different 
types of investors, however, have heterogeneous risk preferences. Theoretical 
literature predicts that start-ups with a relatively small collateral value (Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997, Ueda, 2004), high growth (Ueda, 2004, De Bettignies, 2008), high 
risk (Berger and Udell, 1998, Ueda, 2004) and potentially high profitability (Ueda, 
2004) have a higher probability to receive venture capital than funds from more 
cautious capital suppliers like banks. These theoretical predictions are supported by 
empirical evidence (e.g. Storey, 1993, Audretsch and Lehman, 2004) which suggests 
that small and innovative firms are more likely to be financed by VCs than by banks 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2000, Audretsch and Lehman, 2004, for the U.S.). Given the 
characteristics of high-tech ventures, cautious investors like banks are in general more 
reluctant to provide funding. If the start-up is successful and generates high profits 
their return is bounded to the fixed interest rate, while they bear the full risk in case of 
failure (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Banks require regular interest payments and 
collateral value. During the very early stages, start-ups do usually not generate enough 
returns to be able to pay regular interests (Hall, 2002, Gompers, 1995) and cannot 
provide sufficient collateral for banks (Berger and Udell, 1998, Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002).  
                                                 
2 It is noteworthy that Haeussler et al. (2008) find evidence that other milestones in the patent application process 
at the EPO seem to reduce uncertainty for external VCs. Patent oppositions, for instance, lead to earlier VC 
financing for new ventures. 
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VCs, in contrast, are specialized in financing risky and potentially highly rewarded 
opportunities purchasing an equity stake and providing management support (see e.g. 
Sahlman, 1990). In contrast to banks, they provide monitoring, managerial and 
technical support for the ventures in addition to financial means (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998, Hellmann and Puri, 2000). As they learn more about the firm in the 
course of their involvement and active guidance the ventures’ technologies described 
in patent applications may be of value for VCs, but not for banks. This is not at least 
because VCs are not entirely motivated by financial returns, but also by knowledge 
capture (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). The technical expertise of VCs and their 
possibility to behave opportunistically, hence, creates a double-moral hazard problem 
in the sense that not only the venture’s effort is needed to attain successful outcomes, 
but also the VC’s support and loyalty. Furthermore, in contrast to banks, VCs can 
credibly commit to take over the venture (Landier, 2001, Ueda, 2004, De Bettignies 
and Brander, 2007). In fact, VCs often replace the founders of new ventures by a new 
management team, even if the founders are performing well (Wasserman, 2003, 
Heger and Tykvova, 2009).  
The involvement of VCs and their knowledge capture motivation create a special role 
for IPR in the relationship between VC and venture. IPR protect ventures against 
expropriation by VCs (Ueda, 2004), but probabilistic IPR can encourage VCs to 
invest in ventures if they aim at learning and expropriation (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005).  
The discussion above leads us to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: Uncertain IPR attracts VCs. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Uncertain IPRs discourage banks to invest in new ventures. 
Prior Studies on Uncertain IPRs 
Previous literature shows that uncertainty about IPR can have significant implications. 
For the U.S., Gans et al. (2008) show that patent pendencies reduce licensing 
activities of new ventures. They find that the likelihood of a cooperative licensing 
agreement for an invention increases significantly after a patent has been granted. 
Without formal intellectual property protection for their inventions new ventures fear 
expropriation and limit information disclosure. For a German firm sample that is not 
limited to start-up companies, Czarnitzki et al. (2011) show that patent pendencies 
reduce firms’ R&D collaborations with competitors. Vertical collaboration activities 
are not affected though. We contribute to the empirical literature on patent pendencies 
by investigating their effects on new product launch and the access to external capital 
for start-up companies.  
DATA, VARIABLES’ DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel (SuP), a large 
sample of start-up firms located in Germany. This data set provides comprehensive 
information on German entrepreneurial firms. Started in 2008, the SuP is a joint 
project of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, the 
“Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau“ (KfW) Bankengruppe, Germany’s largest state-
owned promotional bank, and Creditreform, the largest credit rating agency in 
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Germany, and was initiated in 2008. The SuP focuses on legally independent firms 
excluding de-mergers and subsidiaries. The survey is conducted using computer-
assisted telephone interviews. 
The aim of the SuP is to provide a complete track record for entrepreneurial start-ups 
with respect to specific firm characteristics (e.g. sales, number of employees), 
strategic decisions (e.g. composition of the management team, product market entry 
strategy) and financial sources. Firms drop out of the sample if they reach an age of 
eight years.
3
 The assigned foundation year corresponds to the year in which a firm 
starts its regular business activities. 
The SuP is a stratified random sample. The population is taken from the database of 
Creditreform which provides the most comprehensive database for German firms.
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Stratification criteria are the year of firm foundation, industry sector
5
 and promotion 
of the venture by the KfW Bankengruppe. Stratification according to industry is based 
on ten industry clusters, four of which are high-technology industries. Altogether, 
technology-oriented firms represent half of the surveyed firms. Since the annual 
number of new firm formations in high-technology manufacturing is rather small 
(Metzger et al., 2008) each year’s random draw includes entrepreneurial firms which 
have been founded within the last three years. For a more detailed description of the 
sample design we refer to Fryges et al. (2009).  
                                                 
3 In other international surveys on start-up firms, the maximum firm age varies between two and eight years 
depending inter alia on the technology intensity of the respective industries (Van Praag, 2003, Brüderl et al., 2007, 
Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001, Prantl, 2001). 
4 Information on the firm’s name, address, legal form, industry classification and information regarding insolvency 
procedures is included (see Almus et al., 2000, for a detailed description). 
5 The industry sectors agriculture, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, health care, and the 
public sector are excluded from the sample. 
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In order to identify pending patents we linked the SuP to the data base of the German 
Patent and Trademark Office (GPTO) using a computer-based matching algorithm.
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The link between both databases was conducted based on firms’ and founders’ names 
and addresses in the SuP and the names and addresses of patent applicants as listed in 
the patent records of the GPTO. Each match suggested by the algorithm was checked 
manually. It is important to note that we do not only match patent applications to 
company applicants, i.e. the ventures, but also to the entrepreneurs. This is important 
because ventures may be established only after a technical invention by the founder 
has been granted patent protection. In our sample, 91% of the patents are owned by 
the founder and not by the venture. 
Our sample includes ventures that have been founded in the period 2005-2009 in 
Germany and have been surveyed in the period 2008-2009. For our analysis, we only 
focus on new ventures in manufacturing and technology related services as we 
suppose that patenting activities are more pronounced in those sectors. In total, our 
sample includes 2,092 venture year observations. 
Variables’ Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
This section defines and describes the variables used in the empirical analysis. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics for our variables, Table 2 the correlation matrix. 
                                                 
6
 We use the patent database of the GPTO rather than the database of the European Patent Office (EPO) because 
there is a significant overlap of the GPTO database and the database of the EPO. After a patent has been applied 
for at the GPTO patent applicants have a period of twelve months to take the application to the EPO (or other 
patent offices). In particular young and small firms first apply for patent protection at the German national patent 
office before filing a (more costly) patent application at the EPO. Some do not search protection at the European 
level at all. Furthermore, the GPTO provides us with a comprehensive record of the whole patent examination 
process. We use this information to distinguish pending patents from patent applications with a final grant 
decision. 
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Dependent Variables 
We define three different dependent variables. The first variable indicates whether a 
new product has been launched which allows us to test whether new product 
introductions are influenced by patent pendencies. Almost half of the observations 
indicate a new product launch within the last two years (about 43%).  
In order to test whether pending patents impact the access to external financing we 
focus on VCs and banks as potential suppliers of external funds. We define two 
dummy variables indicating whether the venture had access to funds from these 
sources. Most observations in our sample rely on internal financing of their activities 
as is suggested by the previous literature (e.g. Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994): Only 
3% received venture capital and only 12% received funding from banks.  
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
Pending Patents 
With respect to the patenting activities of our sampled ventures we find a small 
numbers of ventures with patent applications. Although 31% of the venture 
observations report that they conduct R&D in-house the number of patent applications 
per firm and founders is quite small with an average patent application stock of 0.02 
per employee per venture observation. The most active venture in terms of patenting 
has a patent stock of three patent applications per employee. 
We make use of the GPTO information in order to identify the ventures’ pending 
patent applications. Pending applications are defined as filings that are still under 
review at the GPTO in the year of interest. We normalize the number of pending 
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patents by the venture’s patent application stock. For our ventures, on average, 2% of 
their patent application stock is still pending. For some ventures, all patent 
applications are still awaiting a decision. Note that the patent variables are lagged by 
one year in order to avoid endogeneity issues. 
Control Variables 
In addition to the variables of main interest, we use a number of control variables. We 
control for firm size in terms of employment since size is likely to be correlated with 
the innovation capabilities of the venture. External investors may use this information 
as an indication for high market potential. We use the logarithm of the number of 
employees in order to account for the skewness of the venture size distribution. In 
order to control for venture performance, we use the empirical price cost margin 
which is on average 6%. This variable further indicates whether a firm already sells 
products in the markets so that it generates returns. In this sense, it also captures the 
availability of internal funds. Another variable that proxies the availability of funds is 
whether the firm is a company with limited liabilities. Companies with limited 
liabilities are more risk-prone and conduct more R&D than others (Czarnitzki and 
Kraft, 2000) so that they might be able to attract VCs more easily whereas they may 
have more difficulties in persuading banks to provide them with funds.   
A variable that controls for the innovation capacity but also for the riskiness of the 
venture is a dummy variable that equals one if the venture conducts R&D in-house. 
We further control for the share of high skilled employees, those with a university 
degree, as opposed to the share of workers without training. The share of high skilled 
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workers is low with about 1%. In contrast, more than 40% of the ventures’ employees 
had no training. 
Moreover, we account for the presence of a corporate investor. Ventures with the 
financial and non-financial backing of a corporation have been found to be more 
success in terms of radical innovation than a control group of independent ventures 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2010). The presence of a corporate investor can impact the 
likelihood to receive funding from other sources as well as the likelihood to introduce 
a new product to the market because, similar to VCs, corporate investors often supply 
managerial guidance in addition to the financial investment. 
We further control for a number of characteristics of the founder or the founding 
team. First of all, 36% of the ventures have been founded by a team. With respect to 
the educational background and experience of the founders, it turns out that almost 
half of the observations have at least one founder holding a university degree. 28% of 
the observations correspond to ventures founded by at least one person with a 
business background, while 50% of the observations are founded by a team or an 
individual entrepreneur with a technical background. At least one of the founders of 
74% of the observations has experience in managing a firm. The most experienced 
team member has worked, on average, for 14 years within the same industry. We use 
the logarithm of this variable to account for the skewness of its distribution. Lastly, it 
should be noted that a relatively large share of the venture observations (42%) has 
been founded by a re-starter. Re-starters might, on the one hand, have advantages for 
managing the new venture due to their past experience. Moreover, they might be 
discriminated by banks and VCs because of their past failure. The educational, 
employment and self-employment experience of the founder can act as a signal to 
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potential investors (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990, Burton et al. 2002, Shane and 
Stuart 2002). 
We further use control variables for the stratification criteria used to create the firm 
sample: industry dummies, year of firm foundation and KfW involvement. Finally, we 
include a dummy for the year of observation to control for possible differences in 
cyclical patterns. These variables are included in all regressions, but not reported. 
ESTIMATION APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
We hypothesize that pending patents affect a firm’s decision to launch new products 
and their access to external financing. Since the access to external funds is likely to 
impact new product launches we are interested in estimating the following equations: 
bank financingi =  pending patentsi +  Xi + ui    (1) 
VC financingi =  pending patentsi +  Xi + vi    (2) 
product launchi =  pending patentsi +  bank financingi +  VC financingi + 
 Xi + wi       (3) 
where X depict our control variables for venture i and u, v and w the error terms 
respectively. 
Recursive Model 
The system of equations presented above can be interpreted as a hierarchical recursive 
model (Maddala 1983, Greene 1998, 2003) because the financing variables enter the 
equation for new product launch as regressors. This renders the sources of external 
finance potentially endogenous regressors in the product launch equation. We apply a 
18 
 
multivariate probit model to estimate the equation system above allowing for 
correlated error terms. This equation system is identified as long as there is enough 
variation in the exogenous regressors (Wilde, 2000). The results are presented in 
Table 3. The correlations between the equations turn out to be not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that although plausible from a theoretical point of 
view we do not face an endogeneity problem with regards to the financing sources for 
our sample so that we can apply standard probit estimation to the individual 
equations.  
Table 3 about here 
Probit Models 
The results of the ordinary probit models are presented in Table 4, the marginal 
effects in Table 5. We first discuss the results for the financing equations. Table 5 
shows that there is a significant positive effect of pending patent applications on the 
probability of receiving venture capital funds. Hence, hypothesis 2a receives support. 
A one unit change of pending patent applications over the patent application stock 
increases the likelihood to receive venture capital by 4%. Although significant in a 
statistical sense, the economic impact of the certification effect of pending patents on 
the venture capital markets is rather small for ventures in Germany.  This might be 
due to the fact that the German venture capital market is rather small. The effect of 
the patent application stock is of similar size indicating that pending patents are twice 
as attractive as the total patent application stock. The result is in line with the findings 
by Haeussler et al. (2008) about the timing of venture capital investment. They find 
venture capital investment to happen after the patent application date rather than after 
the patent grant date. 
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With respect to bank financing there is no significant effect of the patent variables. 
These results suggest that banks do not rely on patent applications, pending or not, as 
quality indicators for ventures. Banks also do not discriminate innovative ventures 
because they are presumably riskier which good news for these ventures is. 
Hypothesis 2b, hence, does not receive support. Overall, the results suggest that risk-
taking VCs prefer to invest in start-ups which already have a proof of concept and are 
passing on to the product development and market launch stage, while banks as more 
cautious investors do not attribute value to patent applications, but not discriminate 
against them either.  
With respect to the control variables, we find that VCs have a preference for team 
foundations and capital companies. The latter effect can be explained by the fact that 
companies with limited liability are more prone to innovation (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 
2000). Ventures with technically educated founders are discriminated against the 
benchmark of having neither a business nor a technical education. Also, founders with 
industry experience are less likely to receive venture capital. This may indicate that 
VCs seek greater influence on technological or commercialization decisions. Banks, 
in contrast, seem to invest in the better risks which are large ventures and they are less 
interested in funding re-starters.  
Focusing on the product launch equation, it appears that pending patents have a 
negative impact indicating that with uncertain IPR ventures are reluctant to 
commercialize technologies. This supports hypothesis 1. The likelihood that the 
ventures introduce a new product decreases by 22% if the pending patents variable 
increases by one unit. This is a significant economic effect.  
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With regards to the control variables, new product launches are more likely to occur 
for large ventures, for ventures that conduct R&D and for venture capital backed 
companies. The latter result suggests that VCs supply non-monetary support in 
addition to capital. The price cost margin shows a negative effect suggesting that 
ventures with a better performance figure and those that already launched at least on 
product tend to be less prone to new product launch. This finding is expected for our 
sample of young and rather small ventures. After their first market launch ventures 
may concentrate on developing and improving the market positioning and features of 
this product and its production. At this stage, the ventures most likely lack the 
capacity to develop and launch further products.  
Table 4 about here 
Table 5 about here 
Robustness Check: Instrumental Variables  
Although the results from the multivariate probit model indicate that there is no 
endogeneity issue with regards to the funding sources in the product launch equation, 
we test whether this result is supported if we use an alternative methodology. A 
second way of dealing with endogenous regressors in our context is to apply 
instrumental variables techniques. Bank financing and venture capital financing are 
treated as potentially endogenous regressors in the product launch equation.  
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As instrument for venture capital financing we use the share of venture capital backed 
ventures on the NUTS 3 regional level.
7
 The availability of venture capital in a 
specific region should be indicative for the likelihood of receiving venture capital 
funding for the individual venture in our sample while the regional venture capital 
supply should not impact the likelihood that the individual venture launches a new 
product.  
As an instrument for bank financing we use a measure for the concentration of public 
banks on the NUTS 3 regional level. We define the market shares of public banks in 
the region and calculate a Herfindahl concentration index. The measure takes values 
between zero and one and reaches it maximum if a region is dominated by a particular 
bank. We focus on public banks for several reasons. First, entrepreneurs typically first 
approach their house bank for a credit before moving to alternative banks and most 
people in Germany have their private bank accounts with public banks. Second, 
public banks fulfill a public mandate to foster small businesses and regional 
development. Finally, public banks do not have return on investment targets so that 
they may be more involved in the support of entrepreneurs. The concentration 
measure depicts the degree of dominance of public banks in a region. If there is a 
strong concentration of public banks in a region the individual ventures’ likelihood to 
receive bank financing should higher because the bank can be assumed to have a 
balanced risk portfolio. The concentration measure is not expected to influence new 
product launches by the venture. 
                                                 
7 NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics and is a geocode standard for classifying 
regions. The NUTS 3 level corresponds to the German county (“Kreis”) level.  
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In the first step, we test whether the proposed instruments are relevant, i.e. the 
instrumental variables have to show a high partial correlation with the potentially 
endogenous variable. We run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for equations 
(1) and (2) and include the respective instrumental variable as an additional regressor. 
According to Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock et al. (2002), a partial F-statistic for 
the instrumental variable which exceeds a critical value of 8.96 for our case indicates 
that the instruments are relevant. Our instruments for both equations turn out to be 
relevant. The share of venture capital backed ventures show an F-statistic of 20.41 in 
the venture capital financing equation and the Herfindahl index for public banks 
shows an F-statistic of 9.87 in the bank financing equation. 
Having shown that our instruments are relevant, we test in the next step whether 
venture capital and bank financing are endogenous regressors in the product launch 
equation. This could be for instance the case if both venture capital financing and the 
likelihood of a product launch would be correlated with the unobserved quality of the 
venture. We apply Smith and Blundell (1986) tests and find that the test statistic does 
not reject exogeneity for both potentially endogenous variables.
8
 This confirms our 
result from the multivariate model by indicating that endogeneity is not a concern for 
our application. Hence, our ordinary probit results presented in the previous 
subsection display unbiased results. 
                                                 
8 In order to do so, we run OLS regressions for equations (1) and (2) and include the respective instrumental 
variable as an additional regressor and obtain the residuals from these regressions. We estimate the probit model 
for the product launch equation, but now also include the residuals obtained in step 1. The standard t-statistic of the 
coefficient of the included residuals is a valid test on endogeneity of the financing variables. 
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Endogeneity of Pending Patents 
A remaining issue is the potential endogeneity of pending patents. Patent applicants at 
the GPTO have the possibility to ask for examination of their patent application for up 
to seven years after the application date. Henkel and Jell (2010) document that more 
than 50% of the patent applications at the GPTO experience an applicant-induced 
examination delay. The reasons for these delays are that applicants aim at creating 
uncertainty for competitors and that they want to gain time for evaluation (Henkel and 
Jell, 2010). This could render the pending patents variable endogenous in our 
regressions. Our analysis so far dealt with the potential endogeneity of pending 
patents by using all patent variables with a one-year lag. Although we suspect that 
strategic delays are not useful for start-up companies that, in contrast to industry 
incumbents, benefit from the certification effect of patents, we test whether pending 
patents are subject to endogeneity in the product launch equation. We use the average 
pendency time for our start-up companies at the industry level as instrument. This 
measure depicts whether ventures induce strategic delays at the patent office due to 
industry specificities. It is, hence, likely to correlate with the patent strategy of 
individual ventures in the same industry, but unlikely to correlate with the likelihood 
of the individual start-up’s product launch. The instrument passes the Staiger and 
Stock (1997) test for relevance with a partial F-statistic of 13.96. A Smith and 
Blundell (1986) test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of pending 
patents. This is in line with our expectation that young ventures do not strategically 
delay the patenting progress because they can substantially benefit from the 
certification effect of patents. 
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DISCUSSION 
Patents can have two important features for young ventures. On the one hand, they 
grant patent holders temporary monopoly rights on inventions safeguarding 
complementary investments needed to develop an idea into a marketable product 
(Teece, 1986). As such, patents should facilitate the market launch of new products. 
On the other hand, patents can act as a “quality” certificate for potential external 
investors (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008, Haeussler et al., 2008).  
The predicted positive effects of patents for new ventures are based on the assumption 
that the patent system works efficiently. In practice, the rights afforded to patent 
holders are however highly uncertain. In this study, we focus on the effect of patent 
pendencies as one source of uncertainty surrounding the patent application process. 
We posit that if patents are pending at the patent office the desirable effects of patents 
for new ventures may not realize.  
Our results for a sample of German ventures support our hypotheses. We show that 
ventures are reluctant to launch new products when patent applications are pending. 
With regards to access to external funds, we find that patent pendencies increase the 
likelihood to receive venture capital financing. Pending patents are more attractive to 
VCs than patent grants. This is in line with the notion that VCs are risk-taking, 
seeking for high returns on innovation as well as in knowledge capture. In particular 
the latter point can render ventures with pending patents attractive. Our results further 
show that neither granted patents nor pending patent applications have an impact on 
bank financing. The (prospect of the) monopoly right for the invention and the 
possibility that the IPR can be traded apparently bears no collateral value for banks. 
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The good news is that there is no evidence for banks discriminating innovative 
ventures. 
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on probabilistic patents and the 
implications of the probabilistic nature of patents (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, Gans et 
al., 2008). Prior literature has shown that once patents are viewed as probabilistic 
legal rights prior results can be challenged. Accounting for the probabilistic nature of 
patents, for instance, mitigates earlier positive findings on the importance of patents 
for licensing agreements (Gans et al., 2008) and R&D collaboration (Czarnitzki et al., 
2011). We contribute to this growing literature by illustrating that it is not the granted 
patent right that attracts VCs, but that pending patents are of higher value to these 
risk-loving investors which aim at financial profits as well as on knowledge capture.  
Our results have important policy implications as well. The predominant role of the 
patent system is to provide incentives to innovate by granting temporarily exclusive 
rights that encourage the commercialization of the patented invention. We show that 
uncertainties created by patent pendencies have negative effects on the 
commercialization of promising ideas. In particular with respect to start-up firms, an 
efficient patent system helps to spur innovation and new product introductions. If new 
ventures hold back the market launch of new products waiting for a patent grant 
decision this can have detrimental consequences for profitability, growth and survival. 
Some caveats have to be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, our 
ventures are very young and exist for a maximum of three years. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether the effects of pending patents sustain for more 
mature ventures. Further, it would be interesting to investigate the selection process 
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into venture capital and bank financing from the ventures’ perspective in more detail 
and the selection process of ventures by the VCs respectively. 
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TABLES  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
variable mean standard deviation 
product launch 0.43 0.50 
VC financing 0.03 0.17 
bank financing 0.12 0.33 
pending patents/patent stock 0.02 0.13 
patent stock/employment 0.02 0.15 
R&D 0.31 0.46 
Log(employment) 1.15 0.64 
team foundation 0.36 0.48 
university degree 0.49 0.50 
business education 0.28 0.45 
technical education 0.50 0.50 
leadership experience 0.74 0.44 
log(work experience in the same field) 2.65 0.66 
restarter 0.42 0.49 
capital company 0.46 0.50 
price cost margin 0.06 0.27 
corporate investor 0.04 0.19 
% employees with university degree 0.01 0.03 
% employees without training  0.42 0.86 
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Table 2: Correlation Table 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 product launch 1 
                 2 VC financing 0.09 1 
                3 bank financing 0.02 0.03 1 
               4 pending patents/patent stock 0.00 0.19 0.02 1 
              5 patent stock/employment 0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.56 1 
             6 R&D 0.30 0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.14 1 
            7 Log(employment) 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.12 1 
           8 team foundation 0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.13 1 
          9 university degree 0.12 0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.27 1 
         10 business education 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.12 1 
        11 technical education -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.19 -0.25 1 
       12 leadership experience 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.08 0.09 1 
      13 log(work experience in the same field) -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.14 0.22 1 
     14 Restarter 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.29 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.50 0.06 1 
    15 capital company 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.13 0.10 0.29 0.28 0.39 0.33 0.15 0.06 0.31 0.09 0.28 1 
   16 price cost margin -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.21 1 
  17 corporate investor 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.16 -0.08 1 
 18 % employees with university degree 0.11 0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.34 0.16 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.29 -0.04 0.16 1 
19 % employees without training  -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.09 -0.20 -0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16 
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Table 3: Multivariate Probit Model (#2092) 
 
VC  
financing 
Bank 
financing 
Product 
launch 
 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
pending patents/patent stock 0.75** 0.30 -0.63** 
 
(0.33) (0.36) (0.29) 
patent stock/employment 0.53* -0.57 0.01 
 
(0.27) (0.57) (0.24) 
R&D  0.15 0.04 0.67*** 
 
(0.15) (0.09) (0.07) 
Log(employment) 0.15 0.25*** 0.17*** 
 
(0.12) (0.06) (0.05) 
team foundation 0.47*** 0.01 -0.10 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.07) 
university degree -0.20 -0.16* 0.15** 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.07) 
business education -0.03 0.08 0.04 
 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.07) 
technical education -0.29* 0.15* -0.08 
 
(0.15) (0.08) (0.07) 
leadership experience 0.20 0.12 0.14* 
 
(0.23) (0.10) (0.08) 
log(work experience in the same field) -0.26** 0.06 -0.07 
 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.05) 
restart -0.22 -0.26*** 0.01 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.07) 
capital company 0.53** -0.08 0.01 
 
(0.21) (0.09) (0.07) 
price cost margin -0.42* -0.17 -0.24** 
 
(0.24) (0.14) (0.11) 
price cost margin missing 0.29** -0.07 -0.12* 
 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.06) 
founded in 2005 0.03 -0.19 -0.29*** 
 
(0.22) (0.13) (0.09) 
founded in 2006 -0.08 -0.08 -0.21** 
 
(0.22) (0.12) (0.09) 
corporate investor 0.29 0.13 0.26* 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.16) 
% employees with university degree 4.56*** -0.87 -0.73 
 
(1.64) (1.58) (1.23) 
% employees without training -0.17 0.00 -0.02 
 
(0.15) (0.05) (0.04) 
VC financing 0.46** 
   
(0.23) 
bank financing -0.11 
   
(0.17) 
constant -2.46*** -1.41*** -0.15 
 
(0.49) (0.24) (0.19) 
2,1 =  0.11 (s.e. = 0.07)                3,1 =  -0.01 (s.e. = 0.07)                 3,2 =  0.08 (s.e. = 0.08)   
LL -2189.65 
  Wald Chi2 487.34 
  ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
5 industry dummies, 1 year dummy and 1 stratification dummy are included but not 
reported. 
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Table 4: Probit Model (#2092) 
 
VC  
financing 
Bank 
financing 
Product 
launch 
 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
pending patents/patent stock 0.75** 0.30 -0.62** 
 
(0.35) (0.41) (0.32) 
patent stock/employment 0.53** -0.57 0.03 
 
(0.27) (0.53) (0.23) 
R&D  0.15 0.05 0.68*** 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.07) 
Log(employment) 0.16 0.25*** 0.16*** 
 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.05) 
team foundation 0.47*** 0.01 -0.10 
 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) 
university degree -0.20 -0.16* 0.15** 
 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) 
business education 0.02 0.08 0.03 
 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.08) 
technical education -0.30** 0.15* -0.08 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.07) 
leadership experience 0.19 0.11 0.13 
 
(0.21) (0.11) (0.09) 
log(work experience in the same field) -0.25** 0.06 -0.07 
 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.05) 
restart -0.22 -0.26*** 0.02 
 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) 
capital company 0.53*** -0.07 0.01 
 
(0.19) (0.10) (0.08) 
price cost margin -0.41* -0.17 -0.23** 
 
(0.25) (0.15) (0.12) 
price cost margin missing 0.28** -0.08 -0.12* 
 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.06) 
founded in 2005 0.03 -0.19 -0.29*** 
 
(0.21) (0.13) (0.10) 
founded in 2006 -0.06 -0.08 -0.20** 
 
(0.21) (0.13) (0.09) 
corporate investor 0.29 0.13 0.26 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) 
% employees with university degree 4.51** -0.90 -0.69 
 
(1.81) (1.95) (1.22) 
% employees without training -0.18 0.00 -0.02 
 
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04) 
VC financing 0.43** 
   
(0.20) 
bank financing 0.05 
   
(0.09) 
constant -2.48*** -1.41*** -0.17 
 
(0.46) (0.25) (0.19) 
LL -196.94 -705.72 -1288.92 
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.08 0.10 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
5 industry dummies, 1 year dummy and 1 stratification dummy are included but not 
reported. 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects  
 
VC  
financing 
Bank 
financing 
Product 
launch 
 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
coef. 
(s.e.) 
pending patents/patent stock 0.04** 0.05 -0.22** 
 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.11) 
patent stock/employment 0.03** -0.11 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.10) (0.08) 
R&D  0.01 0.01 0.24*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log(employment) 0.01 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
team foundation 0.02*** 0.00 -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
university degree -0.01 -0.03* 0.05** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
business education 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
technical education -0.01** 0.03* -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
leadership experience 0.01 0.02 0.05 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
log(work experience in the same field) -0.01** 0.01 -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
restart -0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
capital company 0.03*** -0.01 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
price cost margin -0.02* -0.03 -0.08** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
price cost margin missing 0.01** -0.02 -0.04* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
founded in 2005 0.00 -0.03 -0.10*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
founded in 2006 -0.00 -0.01 -0.07** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
corporate investor 0.01 0.02 0.09 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) 
% employees with university degree 0.22** -0.17 -0.24 
 
(0.09) (0.36) (0.43) 
% employees without training -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
VC financing 0.15** 
   
(0.07) 
bank financing 0.02 
   
(0.03) 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
5 industry dummies, 1 year dummy and 1 stratification dummy are included but not 
reported. 
  
